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I. INTRODUCTION 
The recent emancipation of the Czech and Slovak Federal Re-
public (C.S.F.R.) from the rigid control of the communist regime has 
left President Vaclev Havel with the monumental task of revamping 
an entire socio-political and economic system. A major part of this 
momentous undertaking involves his government's decision to pursue 
a new economic order based on the free market. As the C.S.F.R. 
transforms its economy to capitalism, the government has marked its 
• The author would like to thank Professor Hilary K. Josephs for her assistance. Her 
comments were invaluable, however, any errors or shortcomings are solely the responsibility of 
the author. 
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progress by instituting new legal measures. These measures are 
designed to bring the C.S.F.R.'s moribund economy to a state of sta-
bility and efficiency where market forces reign.1 Specifically, recent 
amendments to the Czechoslovak Act on the Enterprise with Foreign 
Property Participation2 (the Act) reflect this economic transition and 
provides foreign investors with greater access to the C.S.F.R.'s 
markets. 
Whereas the Western Europeans have already secured market 
positions in other Eastern European countries such as Poland and 
Hungary, the C.S.F.R. has not experienced the same level of foreign 
business presence.3 Joint venture activity in the C.S.F.R. before May 
of 1989 was minimal, especially as compared to the number of ven-
tures established in Hungary and Poland within the same time frame. 4 
Yet, the C.S.F.R.'s relatively low level of foreign debt combined with 
a well developed infrastructure make for a more secure economic en-
vironment when compared to other Eastern European countries. s 
Historically, the C.S.F.R. has promoted strong industrial growth and 
developed an efficient transportation system. 6 These factors make the 
C.S.F.R. a good target market for U.S. investors' who want to estab-
lish a business presence in this relatively untapped market and to po-
tentially bolster their competitive position in the world marketplace. 
The purpose of this Note is to assess the potential for successful 
business ventures in the C.S.F.R. in relation to the 1990 amendments 
to the Act. This Note will first discuss the needs and concerns of U.S. 
1. See Remarks on the Amended Enterprise with Foreign Property Participation Act, 
cited in Acts on Economic Relations with Foreign Countries, on the Enterprise with Foreign 
Participation and on the Joint-Stock Companies 35 (1990) (released by the Czechoslovak 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry) [hereinafter Remarks]. 
2. Act on the Enterprise with Foreign Property Participation as amended by Act of April 
19, 1990, Act No. 173of1988 Collection of Laws and Decrees (1990) [hereinafter the Act]. It 
should be pointed out that the law applies to both republics, Czech and Slovak, even though 
the law is entitled the "Czechoslovak Act." 
3. See Changes in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic's Legislation Affecting Foreign 
Investment, East-West Joint Ventures (U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva 
Switz.), No. S, July 1990, at 4 [hereinafter East-West]. 
4. See id. Whereas the Polish and Hungarian governments listed the establishment of 
more than 1,200 joint ventures by May of 1990, the C.S.F.R. government's promulgation of a 
new joint venture law in November of 1988, discussed in text at part 11.C., engendered a 
disappointingly low number of 60 by May 1990 of joint ventures in the Republic. Id. 
S. See CIA Study Predicts Further Economic Decline Even if Government Reform is Well 
Received, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 742 (May 23, 1990). 
6. See George Glos, Czechoslovakia: Law on Joint Ventures, 17 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 1, 2 
(1989). 
7. This Note focuses in part on U.S. law in relation to foreign investment and is intended 
to aid U.S. business persons investing abroad. However, the information pertaining to invest-
ing in the C.S.F.R. applies to investors from western Europe as well as the U.S. 
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business persons who, until now, have been hesitant to join their 
Western European counterparts in establishing a business presence in 
the Eastern European marketplace. It will then analyze the Act and 
determine whether the 1990 amendments sufficiently remove tradi-
tional legal barriers to foreign equity investment in the C.S.F.R. Fi-
nally, this Note concludes that there are numerous economic and 
political measures, embodied in both U.S. and international institu-
tions and legislation, which provide the prudent investor with suffi-
cient security to initiate joint venture activity in the C.S.F.R. 
II. BACKGROUND TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
IN EASTERN EUROPE 
A. Political and Economic Perspectives 
Economists of varied political perspectives recognize that cen-
trally-planned economies have proven unsuccessful throughout the 
latter half of the twentieth century. 8 Most economists would agree 
that decentralized economic policy-making is the best means of re-
structuring the defunct command economies in Eastern European 
countries that hope to increase their standard of living to levels equal 
with the West. 9 Although political democratization is not synony-
mous with free market economics, Eastern European countries in gen-
eral, and the C.S.F.R. in particular, have specifically chosen to replace 
the previous non-market economic organization with a free market 
system. 10 
The recent trend towards economic decentralization prevalent 
throughout Eastern Europe has led many of the former communist 
countries to adopt foreign investment legislation which avoids full-
scale governmental interference and regulation. 11 The hope is that by 
8. See Peter Passell, Where Communist Economies Fell Short, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1989, 
at 03. 
9. Id. 
10. See Remarks, supra note 1, at 35. See also Remarks on the Amended Act on Eco-
nomic Relations with Foreign Countries, cited in Acts on Economic Relations With Foreign 
Countries, on the Enterprise with Foreign Participation and on the Joint-Stock Companies 3 
(1990)(released by the Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce and lndustry)(specifically stating 
the C.S.F.R.'s goal of remaking the economy into a market system). 
11. See Maciej Lebkowski & Jan Monkiewicz, Western Direct Investment in Centrally 
Planned Economies, 20 J. WORLD TRADE L. 624, 627, 634 (1986) [hereinafter Monkiewicz]. 
Foreign investment activity in a non-market economy dates back to 1920 when the U.S.S.R. 
issued a concessionary investment decree that permitted foreign direct investment in certain 
areas, particularly large industrial projects such as oil extraction or mining. Id. at 624. These 
early projects were strictly limited to specific industries, required sizable capital outlays and 
mandated profit return to be made in the form of products rather than hard currency. Id. In 
the early 1970s, Romania and Hungary promulgated legislation that formally instituted legal 
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enacting more liberal investment rules, the respective countries will be 
able to attract western capital to their markets. 12 Enacting these legal 
measures will enable the governments to lift their sagging economies 
out of a serious depression.13 
In the C.S.F.R., the 1990 amendments to the joint venture legis-
lation may be viewed as evidence of President Havel's commitment to 
opening the doors of his country to western investment. 14 Equity in-
vestment is the C.S.F.R.'s favored means for attracting foreign capi-
tal.15 Although foreign investment may be pursued in a variety of 
forms, joint ventures are considered the most practical means of 
achieving a successful business presence in Eastern European coun-
tries.16 Economists have determined that the presence of foreign eq-
uity joint ventures would aid any socialist state in its economic reform 
efforts. 17 
While other options exist for a U.S. business interested in enter-
ing foreign markets, equity investment is the best means to establish a 
long-term business presence and distribute the risk among the partici-
pants.18 For example, choosing contractual agreements as a means of 
entering foreign markets, such as licensing the transfer of technology 
or transferring the right to engage in the distribution of a company's 
goods or services through a franchise agreement, do not allow U.S. 
businesses to become an active participant in the targeted foreign 
regimes to govern foreign investment activity in their respective countries. See id. Hungary's 
subsequent legislative amendments have increasingly liberalized its foreign investment regime, 
succeeding in attracting foreign investors to participate in joint ventures. See id. at 627, 628. 
12. See Glos, supra note 6, at 1 - 3. See also Susan Tiefenbrun, Joint Ventures in the 
U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe, and the People's Republic of China as of December 1989, 21 INT'L L. 
& POL. 667, 671 (1989). An influx of western capital would bolster the countries' prospects of 
expanding trade operations with other capitalist countries, acquiring hard currency, improving 
the quality of imported goods, and promoting exports. See id. 
13. See Tiefenbrun, supra note 12, at 668, 669. 
14. Premier Marian Calfa listed the following industries as priority areas to be developed 
with the aid of western capital: nuclear energy, pollution control equipment, glass and textile 
manufacturing, aviation, automotive, and electronics. East-West Trade: Czechoslovakia's Eco-
nomic Reform Package Based on Free Price Regime, Currency Reform, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. 
(DNA) No. 23, at 803 (June 6, 1990). 
15. See Remarks, supra note 1, at 39. 
16. See id. 
17. Erwin Eichmann, Joint Ventures in Hungary: A Model for Socialist States?, 20 LA w & 
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 257, 259 (1988). 
18. See Michael Berwind, Strategies/or Entering Foreign Markets, 7 HASTINGS INT'L & 
COMP. L. REV. 293, 298 (1984). Risk spreading is a principal feature of the joint venture 
vehicle. See Dennis Unkovic, Joint Ventures and the Export Trading Company Act, 5 J.L. & 
COM. 373, 374 - 75 (1984). The agreement between two or more companies to form a corpo-
rate joint venture allows the respective participants to apportion responsibility in such areas as 
technology, labor, and capital contributions. See id. at 374. 
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market. 19 Furthermore, while contractual arrangements require less 
of a capital commitment than do equity investments, they tend to 
limit the investor's potential economic return. 20 Thus, equity invest-
ment would allow the western investor to establish a long-term pres-
ence in the C.S.F.R. with a greater degree of control and it would also 
allow her to work to expand her market share in Eastern Europe as a 
whole. 
B. Traditional Western Reluctance to Investing in Eastern Europe: 
Relevant Factors 
The Act, as amended, substantially differs from the previous for-
eign investment legislation in the C.S.F.R. This is especially true in 
areas of paramount concern to the potential foreign investor.21 While 
a number of the changes will be well received by the interested west-
ern participant, the Act also leaves in place pre-existing restrictions, 
or incorporates new conditions that may act as disincentives to the 
investor.22 Consequently, when evaluating the Act and its potential 
for attracting western investment in the C.S.F.R., it is useful to ex-
amine the factors which generally attract western investors to the 
eastern marketplace, and what barriers traditionally cause these po-
tential market participants to venture elsewhere. 
A western investor will venture into a socialist economy when 
the political and economic climate of the country indicates that she 
will "get a positive return on investment."23 A foreign investor is typ-
ically attracted to the idea of establishing a business presence in new 
or unexplored markets and is often lured East by the existence of a 
well-educated, yet inexpensive labor supply. 24 By utilizing the joint 
venture to invest in an Eastern European country, the investor suc-
cessfully avails herself of choice sources of raw materials and energy. 
By establishing a business presence in the C.S.F.R., the investor also 
gains the advantage of being in close proximity to customers in the 
C.S.F.R. as well as potential customers in neighboring central and 
eastern Europe. 2s 
19. See Berwind, supra note 18, at 294 - 95. 
20. See id. at 298. 
21. See the Act, supra note 2. 
22. See East-West, supra note 3, at 4. 
23. Eichmann, supra note 17, at 258. 
24. See Roxanne Jansen, Western Investment in State-Controlled Economies: Establish-
ment of Joint Ventures in Eastern European Countries, 5 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 507, 
508 (1980). See also Walter Kolvenbach, General Factors Influencing a European Businessman 
When Deciding to Invest Abroad, 17 INT'L Bus. LAW. 313, 314 - 15 (1989). 
25. See Jansen, supra note 24, at 508. 
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In addition, the joint venture participant is in a better position 
than a licensor or franchise partner to react swiftly to market oppor-
tunities and changing market conditions. 26 Yet, the risk of investing 
will often outweigh these benefits in the mind of the investor when the 
target country's government strictly controls foreign equity invest-
ment. 27 When a foreign investor is deciding whether or not to invest 
in a socialist state, she will conduct a cost-benefit analysis. 28 If the 
investor determines that sufficient legal and economic reforms have 
been instituted to insure a profitable return on the investment, then 
she is in a better position to proceed with the proposed venture. 29 
C. Evolution of the C.S.F.R. 's Foreign Equity Investment 
Legislation 
Even before the democratic wave swept away the communist 
governments of Eastern Europe in 1989, the region's leaders recog-
nized that the then existing economic system of state planning was 
failing. The government of the C.S.F.R. acknowledged this fact in its 
1985 decision to implement certain "Principles" that would allow 
limited foreign investment in the country.30 However, the Principles 
embodied strict legal rules that effectively discouraged almost any for-
eign investment interest in the C.S.F.R.31 Most significantly, the legal 
regime limited foreign participation in a joint venture to forty-nine 
percent ownership. 32 
26. See id. 
27. See id. See also 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)(Nov. 16, 1989). Factors of major concern 
include governmental regulation of the authorization and internal managerial structure, re-
stricted ownership percentage, permissible levels of foreign currency exchange and possibility 
of profit repatriation for the proposed joint venture. The political atmosphere, limited access 
to certain markets, lack of a convertible currency and development of distribution systems in 
the host country also factor into the decision of whether to embark on a joint venture in an 
eastern European country. For example, whereas the C.S.F.R. has a well-developed infra-
structure, Poland suffers from systemic distribution defects which effect economic activity at 
all levels. 
28. See Eichmann, supra note 17, at 259. 
29. See id. "[E]conomic reforms reduce the microeconomic inefficiencies of a socialist 
economy, legal reforms promote predictability and reduce the uncertainty of entry into a dif-
ferent political and economic climate, and tax incentives strive to overcome any remaining 
economic inefficiencies." Id. 
30. See Principle No. 187of1985 Collection of Laws and Decrees (1985). See also Glos, 
supra note 6, at 2. 
31. See Foreign Majority Shareholders Allowed in New Czechoslovakia Joint Venture Law, 
6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 74 (January 18, 1989). The Principles severely curtailed a 
foreign investor's ability to negotiate the aspects of the proposed venture. Twenty-four acts 
and decrees promulgated in the postwar era contained legal precepts that dictated the narrow 
scope of acceptable joint ventures in the Republic. 
32. See Glos, supra note 6, at 1 - 2. Another major obstacle to foreign investment was the 
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The Principles were amended in 1987 by relaxing slightly the dic-
tates governing acceptable foreign investment, but still retained basic 
strictures of comprehensive governmental oversight controlling the 
authorization, management, and permissible scope of activity in a 
proposed venture. 33 By 1988, it was abundantly clear that the 
C.S.F.R.'s state-planning was not providing promised economic jus-
tice or stability. Forty years of command-economy control, prescrib-
ing heavy industry expansion and armament production at the 
expense of light industry and consumer goods, left the C.S.F.R. bereft 
of its resources and with a substantially reduced national standard of 
living.34 
On November 8, 1988, the C.S.F.R. moved to restore the falter-
ing economy with the aid of western capital, by promulgating liberal-
ized joint venture legislation35 that government officials touted as "the 
most advanced of those in eastern Europe. " 36 The legislation entered 
into force in January 1989, and permitted foreign participation in any 
area of the national economy except those that fell under the heading 
of national defense. 37 Little more than one year later, the newly 
formed democratic government of the C.S.F.R. recognized the neces-
sity of increasing the flexibility of its foreign investment regime if it 
hoped to achieve substantial growth through the joint venture vehi-
cle. 38 Thus, the amendments to the Act were adopted on April 19, 
1990, and entered into force less than two weeks ~ater. 39 
III. ASSESSMENT OF THE POTENTIAL FOR SUCCESSFUL JOINT 
VENTURE ACTIVITY IN THE C.S.F.R. 
A. Current Joint Venture Legislation 
In brief, the Act's most significant amendments reform a number 
lack of any specified dispute resolution mechanism. See id. at 2. Thus, in case of a legal 
dispute, the investor was forced to litigate under C.S.F.R. law. Id. 
33. See id. 
34. See id. 
35. Act on the Enterprise with Foreign Property Participation, Act No. 173 of 1988 Col-
lection of Laws and Decrees (1988). 
36. See East-West, supra note 3, at 4. See also J. Connor, Czechoslovakia: Foreign Prop-
erty Participation Act, As Amended, 29 l.L.M. 1047 (1990). Although the law was a vast 
improvement over the rigid Principles of 1985 and 1987, the lingering provisions for govern-
mental interference effectively discouraged all but a handful of western companies from pursu-
ing venture opportunities in the C.S.F.R. 
37. See Foreign Majority Shareholdings Allowed in New Czechoslovakia Joint Venture 
Law, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 74 (Jan. 18, 1989). 
38. See Connor, supra note 36. 
39. See East-West, supra note 3, at 4. The amendments entered into force on May 1, 
1990. 
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of areas of concern to the western investor. Specifically, the joint ven-
ture legislation amended restrictions on foreign participation and ma-
jority share, application and authorization requirements for the 
national, i.e. C.S.F.R., partner and the western investor and widens 
the scope of permissible areas in which a westerner may invest. 40 
The Act substantially altered the C.S.F.R.'s previously restrictive 
foreign investment regime. A principal change is the provision that 
allows citizens of the C.S.F.R., as well as juridical persons (i.e. corpo-
rations) to engage in an enterprise with foreign participation.41 In 
contrast, the previous joint venture law restricted Czech participation 
to juridical persons only (i.e. corporate bodies such as foreign trade 
organizations and state enterprises).42 Additionally, the government 
repealed the 1988 restriction on foreign participation, which allowed 
foreigners to be majority shareholders, but limited total ownership to 
ninety-nine percent, and now permits 100% foreign interest. 43 
The Act provides that it "shall apply also to cases where the en-
terprise is established exclusively by a foreign participant or where 
such a participant participates exclusively in its trading."44 The gov-
ernment has further proposed that foreign investors be exempted en-
tirely from licensing procedures. This provision applies where the 
proposed venture does not include a local equity participation. 4s 
Thus, it grants the investor freedom to structure the proposed venture 
virtually devoid of governmental interference and bureaucratic 
regulation. 46 
40. See Remarks, supra note 1, at 36 - 39. 
41. See the Act, supra note 2, art. 2(2). See also East-West, supra note 3, at 4. 
42. See id. 
43. The Act, supra note 2, art. 2(4). See also Economic Assistance to Eastern Europe 
Examined by General Accounting Office, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 326 (Feb. 27, 
1991 ). This one percentage point difference effectively allows the investor to operate her busi-
ness enterprise completely devoid of C.S.F.R. participation. Similar liberal provisions in the 
Hungarian foreign investment laws successfully attracted more U.S. companies to invest in 
that Eastern European country than in any other in 1990. 
44. The Act, supra note 2, art. 2(4). 
45. See Czechoslovakia Government Proposes Easing Regulations on Foreign Investment 
Licensing, 8 lnt'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 92 (Jan. 16, 1991)[hereinafter Easing Regula-
tions]. From May to December of 1990, 20% of C.S.F.R licensed joint ventures were wholly 
western owned enterprises. 
46. See Dow Chairman Sees Bright Prospects for U.S. Business in Eastern Europe, 7 Int'l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 742 (May 23, 1990). At a symposium sponsored by the Commit-
tee for Economic Development held on May 17, 1990, the President of Dow Chemical Com-
pany, Paul F. Orrefice, noted that the major political impediment to doing business in Eastern 
Europe is not fear of political upheaval, but rather adversity to extensive bureaucratic over-
sight. Orrefice maintained that the solution to this problem could be found in granting western 
investors full ownership of East European facilities. However, the investor must be wary of 
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Additionally, articles 5 through 7 significantly streamline the 
previously complex application and authorization procedures. 47 The 
Act substantially reduces the information disclosure requirements 
previously required for venture applications. 48 Except for banking 
ventures, which remain entrusted to the authority of the State Bank of 
the C.S.F.R., the authorization process has been taken out of the 
hands of the various ministries previously involved in venture ap-
proval, and placed wholly in the purview of the office of the Federal 
Ministry of Finance. 49 The Ministry is currently required to either 
approve or reject the application within two months, as opposed to 
the previous three month allowance.so Finally, for the investor who 
would rather enter into a venture with a pre-existing company than 
start up a new business, the Act now provides the possibility for for-
eign investors to purchase a stake in an established enterprise.s1 
B. Incentives to Foreign Equity Investment 
One of the most critical characteristics of an attractive invest-
ment scheme is the ability of the foreign investor to realize a return in 
the form of hard currency.s2 The Act's regressive foreign exchange 
regime and profit repatriation provisionss3 have been tempered by the 
government's decision to permit foreign companies to open foreign 
further legal, e.g. currency restrictions, and extra-legal restraints that would impede her free-
dom in spite of the removal of administrative obstacles. See text infra part 111.C. 
47. See Remarks, supra note 1, at 36. 
48. See East-West, supra note 3, at 4. The new law significantly shortens the list of infor-
mation required to be provided by the Czech and Slovak partner(s) in the joint venture appli-
cation. While the basic information, such as the name, location, business and financing of the 
enterprise must still be provided, it is no longer necessary to provide detailed information 
concerning the western participants or express purposes for the enterprise. The onerous burden 
of conducting and submitting a feasibility study on the proposed business has also been 
abolished. 
49. See id. at 5. 
50. See id. at 37. 
51. See the Act, supra note 2, art. 2(1). See also Remarks, supra note 1, at 36. Under the 
original version of the law, a foreign joint venture had to be a newly created enterprise. This 
development is a marked improvement for the investor who is unwilling to assume the risks 
involved in launching a start-up business. 
52. See supra notes 27 - 29. 
53. See the Act, supra note 2, arts. 15 - 18. See also East-West, supra note 3, at 5. The 
Act requires the enterprise to receive prior approval from a C.S.F.R. bank before opening a 
foreign currency account with a foreign bank, and mandates that the joint venture sell a por-
tion of its foreign currencies to the State Foreign Exchange Bank. At the time the Act was 
enacted, paragraph 12 of the Federal Republic Foreign Exchange Law No. 474 stated that 
30% of an enterprise's foreign exchange had to be sold to the State Bank. Interested investors 
are advised to remain abreast of further revisions in the Act and related legislation regarding 
foreign exchange restrictions. 
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currency accounts with banks in the C.S.F.R.s4 The government of 
the C.S.F.R. moved to allay remaining concerns about the Act's strict 
foreign currency regulations by enacting a new foreign exchange law, 
which went into effect January 2, 1991. ss The foreign exchange law 
was conceived in accordance with the government's efforts to attract 
western investment. s6 The new law is designed to work in conjunc-
tion with the C.S.F.R.'s privatization effortss7 and its September 1990 
decision to make the crown a convertible currency.ss 
As previously noted, the Act's incentives also include the pro-
gressive provisions concerning participation and ownership rightss9 
and relaxed requirements governing application and authorization 
procedures. 60 In addition, the Act provides for increased autonomy 
in structuring the enterprise.61 Furthermore, foreign banks, previ-
ously prohibited from investment opportunities in the C.S.F.R., may 
take advantage of the joint venture legislation and have presently 
done so. 62 The Act also furnishes a supplementary investment incen-
tive by revising the dispute resolution system. Parties are now al-
lowed to contractually agree to resolve commercial disputes in a 
54. See Czechoslovakia Fears Banking System Chaos as it Implements New Foreign Ex-
change Law, 7 lnt'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 1646 (Oct. 31, 1990). Fearing that compa-
nies would opt to open accounts abroad rather than comply with the Act's prohibitive 
exchange requirements, the government opted to eliminate the provision forbidding foreign 
currency accounts. 
55. See Czechoslovakia Fears Banking System Chaos as it Implements New Foreign Ex-
change Law, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 52 (Jan. 9, 1991). See also supra notes 27 - 29. 
However, the increased autonomy available to the parties in structuring joint ventures does not 
adequately compensate the investor for difficulties in repatriating profits. 
56. See id. 
57. See Czechoslovakia Auctions Stores to Private Buyers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1991, at 
AlO. See also Steve Prokesch, Czechs Plan Big Sale of State Companies, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 
1991, at 02. The C.S.F.R. has formulated a complex scheme whereby smaller enterprises are 
auctioned off to private C.S.F.R. investors, and 50 larger state-owned enterprises will be dena-
tionalized by sale to foreign investors. The specified state companies will be converted into 
private concerns by means of foreign sales and/or through a detailed voucher system, whereby 
citizens of the C.S.F.R. may exchange vouchers, bought from the state at a nominal price, for 
shares in a specific enterprise. Regarding details of the original voucher design, see Creating 
the Invisible Hand, THE EcoNOMIST, May 11, 1991, at 63. 
58. See Czechoslovakia Plans to Levy Import Surtax on Consumer Goods to Save Foreign 
Exchange, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 49, 1894 (Dec. 12, 1990). To date, this decision is 
still in the planning stage. 
59. See supra notes 42 - 46 and accompanying text. 
60. See supra note 4 7 and accompanying text. 
61. See infra note 68 regarding the removal of the requirement to establish three distinct 
funds. 
62. See id. Societe Generale contracted itself a 75% stake in a joint venture agreement 
struck with a C.S.F.R. bank. 
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manner that is mutually acceptable. 63 
A final catalyst to western investment is found not in the legisla-
tion, but in the general attitude of trust and respect that the citizens of 
the C.S.F.R. have for U.S. investors. United States' companies have a 
reputation for their technological development and management tech-
niques. 64 President Havel promotes the C.S.F.R.'s wealth of cheap 
but educated labor, the opportunity to develop new markets, and a 
relatively stable political atmosphere as further inducements for U.S. 
investors to pursue investment opportunities in the C.S.F.R.65 
More importantly, because of Germany's history of dominating 
the Eastern Europeans in general and the subjugation the C.S.F.R. 
suffered under the Third Reich, these countries are wary of substan-
tial German investment.66 Nonetheless, the citizens of the C.S.F.R. 
are a pragmatic people who recognize the urgent need for an influx of 
capital to achieve successful market reform. Consequently, where 
U.S. interest is lacking and German businesses move to propose con-
crete investments, the citizens of the C.S.F.R. may put aside their his-
torical fears and establish joint ventures with German parties. 67 
63. See Czechoslovakia Eases Joint Venture Law as it Embarks on Major Economic Re-
form, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 591 (Apr. 25, 1990). The Act does away with the 
previous requisite that any business dispute be submitted to C.S.F.R. arbitration. The Act 
currently authorizes joint venture participants to draft a choice of law clause into the contract 
if they so desire. However, the Act is silent in ·regard to choice of forum clauses. Thus, the 
investor must be aware that despite the possibility of choosing what law will govern the dis-
pute, without the availability of a neutral forum she may still be deprived of objective dispute 
resolution. See Remarks, supra note 1, at 37. 
64. See Eagleburger Urges U.S. Companies Not to Give up on Eastern Germany, 7 Int'l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1553 (Oct. 10, 1990). Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. 
Eagleburger asserted that these qualities would prove advantageous to U.S. companies compet-
ing against European and Japanese firms for investment opportunities in Eastern Europe. 
65. See Czechoslovakia's Economic Reform Package Based on Free Price Regime, Cur-
rency Reform, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 803 (June 6, 1990). The government is also 
emphasizing the abundance of manufacturing facilities in its bid to attract western capital. 
66. See Investment Funds Termed Better .Alternative to Privatize Industries than Joint 
Ventures, 7 lnt'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1204 (Aug. 11, 1990). The East Europeans are 
especially uneasy about German investors acquiring large stakes along their border areas. The 
Czech and Slovak people are particularly concerned with the possibility of a unified Germany 
expanding its borders into C.S.F.R. territory. This fear of expansionism is based on memories 
of the control exerted by the Germans during the reign of the Third Reich when Nazi Ger-
many occupied the C.S.F.R. 
67. See Eastern Europe Wrestles With Public Reaction to Economic Change, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 7, 1991, at Al, AS. Volkswagen A.G. has successfully negotiated a majority stake in the 
C.S.F.R. automobile concern Skoda, committing itself to an investment totalling more than 
five billion dollars. 
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C. Barriers to Foreign Equity Investment 
Although the Act has significantly improved upon the legislative 
framework governing joint venture activities in the past two years, 
from the foreign investor's point of view, the C.S.F.R. continues to 
place formidable obstacles to substantial foreign investment. The 
overarching problem is the country's continued refusal to, in fact, re-
linquish control over an enterprise's activities and finances. For ex-
ample, notwithstanding the modification to the requirement that an 
enterprise create three specific funds out of its capital, 68 the Act now 
requires the entity to create a reserve fund to which a minimum of ten 
percent of its capital must be contributed. 69 
The government is similarly unwilling to yield full authority in 
the authorization process. Article 7(1) of the Act stipulates that en-
terprise authorization be conditioned upon the venture's propensity to 
"contribute to the increase of fruitful participation of the C.S.F.R. 
economy in the international division of labor and whether during its 
economic activity it will be able to create sufficient financial resources 
both in Czechoslovak as well as in foreign currencies."70 However, if 
the venture is a wholly-owned western enterprise, these bureaucratic 
impediments may be avoided. 1 1 
Furthermore, the Act does not proffer per se tax incentives to the 
potential investor72 similar to those offered by other Eastern Euro-
pean countries. 73 Despite the option to apply for a two-year tax ex-
emption or reduction (by reason of a still operative provision of the 
68. See Remarks, supra note 1, at 37. The law previously stipulated that three specific 
funds designated for reserve, cultural and social needs, and remunerations were to be created 
out of foreign investment capital. These requirements are similar to those stipulated in previ-
ous Soviet foreign investment regulations. Under the former Soviet regime, renumerations 
were set aside for the purpose of establishing a bonus fund. Based on the Soviet model, one 
may interpret renumeration here to mean a bonus fund, although it is not defined in the Act or 
the Remarks. These requirements were basically a bureaucratic measure to ensure that a set 
amount of currency would be given to the C.S.F.R. in exchange for the its authorization to 
conduct business. While the Act reduces this requirement to the establishment of a reserve 
fund only, it introduces the 10% asset contribution, a portion of which must be held in con-
vertible currency. Thus, the Act, although simplifying procedural requirements, still retains a 
substantive capital outlay requirement. 
69. See id. 
70. The Act, supra note 2, art. 7(1). 
71. See Easing Regulations, supra note 45. 
72. See Remarks, supra note 1, at 38. Technically, enterprises should be taxed in accord-
ance with the C.S.F.R.'s tax law, which is the Act No. 157 of 1989, Collection on Laws and 
Decrees. The maximum tax rate is 40%. Tax on dividends is set at 25%. 
73. See East-West, supra note 3, at 10. In their bid to attract western capital, offers are 
sweetened with the extension of a three year tax holiday to the first-time investors in Poland, 
or an exemption from any profit tax for the first two years of a joint venture in Romania. 
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original 1988 version of the law74), potential tax liabilities7s act as dis-
incentives to western investment. In deference to western concern 
over the lack of tax concessions, the government has offered to negoti-
ate tax provisions on a case-by-case basis. 76 The government's offer of 
potential negotiations only adds to the list of undesirable uncertainties 
surrounding contract negotiations that will leave the investor wary of 
doing business in the C.S.F.R. 
Additional legal and non-legal concerns may affect an investor's 
decision. If the new enterprise will be exporting products to the U.S., 
then it must consider whether those exports affect U.S. trade which 
may subject it to potential antitrust violations under U.S. law.77 
Under the U.S. Justice Department's policy of enforcing .antitrust 
laws against foreign joint venture activity, U.S. courts will retain ju-
risdiction over activity that impacts U.S. import trade regardless of 
the location of the activity or the nationality of the participant. 78 
Competition restraints within the C.S.F.R. itself must also be 
weighed. President Havel's governmental representative Jan Vrba 
stated in a news telecast that foreign investors may be exempted from 
74. See Act on the Enterprise with Foreign Proprietary Participation, Act No. 173 of 
1988 Collection of Laws and Decrees, art. 11 (1988). See also East-West, supra note 3, at 10. 
75. See Berwind, supra note 18, at 295. The investor must be aware of tax consequences 
in the host country. To date, the U.S. does not have a tax treaty with the C.S.F.R. Conse-
quently, U.S. investors are not only subject to C.S.F.R. tax laws, but without a tax treaty, they 
will not be afforded any tax credit under U.S. tax law. 
76. See Czechs Target 50 State Companies as Models to Lure Western Capital, 8 Int'l 
Trade Rep. 950 (BNA) No. 25, at 950 (June 19, 1991). For example, the C.S.F.R. agreed to 
relieve Volkswagen and Skoda of numerous tariff and import duties and to accord the new 
enterprise a tax holiday for its first two years. The C.S.F.R. was willing to forego these taxes 
in this case due to the magnitude of this particular investment. For smaller businesses contem-
plating a joint venture, the C.S.F.R. presumably will not be so quick to waive such tax revenue. 
77. See Joseph Brodley, Analyzing Joint Ventures with Foreign Partners, 53 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 73 (1984). U.S. antitrust laws may prohibit anti-competitive corporate agreements. For 
instance, where a joint venture would combine two competing companies into a single business 
enterprise, the possibility of anti-competitive effect will give rise to an antitrust inquiry. The 
basic test utilized to determine facial risk of antitrust activity under U.S. law is premised on 
the evaluation of objective market criteria. If facial risk is clearly established, the inquiry will 
proceed to a secondary or subjective test that considers all relevant factors. The determinative 
question is whether, under the particular circumstances, the existence of facial anti-competi-
tiveness or "concentration" is so detrimental to the market that governmental interference in 
the private enterprise is warranted. If products exported to the U.S. by foreign ventures do not 
undercut competition in the U.S. marketplace, then the enterprise will not be subject to 
charges of antitrust violation. For a more detailed analysis of antitrust implications for foreign 
joint ventures, see Joseph Griffin & Michael Calabrese, U.S. Antitrust Policies on Transnational 
Joint Ventures, 17 INT'L Bus. LAW. 319 (1989). 
78. See Robert Shimp, A Critical Review of the Justice Department's 1988 Antitrust Guide-
lines for International Operations, 14 N.C. J.INT'L & COM. REG. 287 (1989). 
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the purview of the C.S.F.R. 's antitrust laws in certain instances. 79 In~ 
vestors must also be wary that joint venture activity does not impinge 
on U.S. antidumping legislation.80 
Finally, the nationalistic clamorings of the Slovakian people have 
raised the question of a possible breakup of the country into two in-
dependent republics. 81 The political risk of doing business in the 
C.S.F.R. is born more out of frustration and resentment presented by 
economic austerity, 82 than out of a general consensus on indepen-
dence. 83 The governmental effort at economic reform includes radi-
cally reduced weapons production, but because the core of the 
armament production facilities are located within Slovakia and be-
cause implementing such a plan would necessarily result in wide-
spread job layoffs, the C.S.F.R. has been threatened by Slovakia with 
secession. 84 
Consequently, President · Havel conceded to the demands of the 
defense industry to retain production standards, ss thereby quelling 
the calls for an independent Slovakia and stabilizing the political cli-
79. See id. at 311. 
80. See Czechs Target 50 State Companies as Models to Lure Western Capital, 8 Int'l 
Trade Rep. 950 (BNA) No. 25, at 950 (June 19, 1991). In an effort to launch the sale of 50 of 
the state's largest enterprises to foreign investors, Vrba offered to relieve participating investors 
from regulation by the C.S.F.R.'s antitrust laws. However, an investor must still be concerned 
with the application of U.S. antidumping laws to joint venture products that are imported to 
the U.S. U.S. antidumping law prohibits sales of imported goods at less than fair market value 
which cause injury to a U.S. industry. See Antidumping Act§ 20l(a), 19 U.S.C. § 160(a). If 
the U.S. International Trade Commission (1.T.C.) determines that a domestic industry has 
been injured, then duties will be imposed on the imported goods. The l.T.C. has found injury 
to U.S. markets even where products are produced and imported from a non-market economy 
country. See Electric Golf Cars from Poland, 40 Fed. Reg. 53,383 (1975) (final affirmative 
antidumping determination). See also Electric Golf Cars from Poland, 45 Fed. Reg. 39,581, 19 
C.F.R. 353 (1980) (revocation of antidumping order); Electric Golf Cars from Poland, 57 Fed. 
Reg. 10334-02 (1992) (final results of antidumping duty administrative review). See generally 
Note, Dumping from "Controled Economy" Countries: The Polish Golf Car Case, 11 LA w & 
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 777 (1979). 
81. See Czechoslovakia: Compare and Contrast, THE EcoNOMIST, July 13, 1991, at 53. 
82. See Economic Assistance to Eastern Europe Examined by General Accounting Office, 8 
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 326 (Feb. 27, 1991). Like its Eastern European neighbors, it 
is predicted that the C.S.F.R. will experience initial economic deterioration in its conversion 
from a non-market to market economy. In particular, the former communist countries will 
experience a drop in gross national product and suffer from the lack of subsidized trade with 
the Soviet Union that was heavily relied upon by the countries of the region. 
83. See Czechoslavakia: Compare and Contrast, supra note 81. 
84. See John Togliabue, Scrap the Tanks? For Slovaks Its a Call to Arms, N.Y. TIMES, 
April 3, 1991, at A4. 
85. See John Togliabue, For Eastern Europe, Security Means More Than Tanks and Guns, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1991, Sec. 4, at 2. 
14
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 18, No. 1 [1992], Art. 9
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol18/iss1/9
1992] C.S.F.R. Joint Venture Opportunities 213 
mate.86 However, with the advent of further economic austerity, polit-
ical instability will remain a continued danger. Incontrovertibly, 
western initiative will be restrained due to the legal and political fac-
tors that continue to act as deterrents on foreign investment. None-
theless, with the aid of public and private risk guarantors, the investor 
may exercise moderate restraint and still structure a lucrative business 
venture in the C.S.F.R. 
IV. ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF INVESTMENT GUARANTEES AND 
INCENTIVES 
A. U.S. Aids to Investment 
Numerous sources of insurance and financial incentives are avail-
able to the western investor. These sources may provide the desired 
guarantees still lacking in the C.S.F.R.'s legislation and create the 
necessary incentive for one to pursue joint venture opportunities in 
the C.S.F.R. The U.S. government is concerned with promoting suc-
cessful private business ventures in the C.S.F.R. on a geopolitical 
level, i.e. ensuring that this emerging democracy will be supplied with 
the western capital its economy needs to grow into a true free-market 
economy.87 
The U.S. government is also interested on a commercial level, i.e. 
protecting the reputation of U.S. companies in the international mar-
ketplace. 88 It believes that by providing insurance and other financial 
incentives, private investors will invest their capital in the C.S.F.R. 
Thus, the U.S. government's promotion of private investment in the 
C.S.F.R. achieves the dual purpose of assisting a fledgling democracy 
to develop a free-market system, while simultaneously bolstering the 
U.S. position in world trade. 
86. See Czechoslavakia: Compare and Contrast, supra note 81. The Slovak call for eco-
nomic autonomy is a based on a fear of economic collapse in that region should the federal 
government close down the defense industry. As arms production is a major component of the 
Slovak economy, the result of a shut down would be widespread unemployment. The separat-
ists constitute only a minority of the Slovak population and have no cohesive strategy or plat-
form for outright independence. Presumably, concessions such as that granted by the federal 
government to Slovakia regarding armament production levels will be sufficient to appease the 
demands for increased sovereignty over Slovakian economic affairs. 
87. See Fred Kaplan, 24 Nations OK Plan to Aid Eastern Europe, BosToN GLOBE, July 5, 
1990, (Nat'l/Foreign), at 1. See also 135 CoNG. REC. Sl 1384 - 02 (Sept. 19, 1989)(statement 
of Sen. Cranston). In commenting on the Support for East European Democracy Program 
(S.E.E.D.), Senator Cranston contended that the United States has a compelling national inter-
est to see through the democratic transition in Eastern Europe. 
88. See New Bill Would Revamp U.S. Foreign Aid Program by Tying Assistance to Ex-
ports, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 104, at A-2 (May 30, 1990). 
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An U.S. investor can obtain insurance on her investment at the 
domestic level through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
(O.P.l.C.).89 0.P.l.C. extends political risk insurance to companies 
venturing into the Eastern European marketplace. 90 For example, in 
January of 1990, O.P.l.C. announced its commitment to insure Gen-
eral Electric Company against political risk in its investment activities 
in Hungary.91 Opportunities for investment aid in the C.S.F.R. may 
also be available through the Support for Eastern European Democ-
racy Act (S.E.E.D.).92 S.E.E.D. provides funds to aid private invest-
ment in Eastern European countries through equity investments, 
technical assistance and training as well as loans and grants.93 
Although S.E.E.D. funds were originally established as stabilization 
funds for Hungary and Poland specifically, the U.S. Congress is con-
sidering legislation that would make S.E.E.D. funds available for gen-
eral use in the C.S.F.R. 94 
The U.S. government proved its firm commitment to increasing 
the C.S.F.R.'s trading position, making it more attractive to foreign 
investors, by concluding a bilateral trade agreement with the C.S.F.R. 
which granted it Most Favored Nation (MFN) status.95 A significant 
89. See OPIC to Provide Political Risk Insurance for $150 Million GE Investment in Hun-
gary, 7 lnt'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 77 (Jan. 17, 1990). See also U.S. DEP'T COM. EAST-
ERN EUROPE BUSINESS BULLETIN 4 (May 1990) [hereinafter BULLETIN]. 
90. See BULLETIN, supra note 89, at 4. To achieve its goal of promoting economic 
growth in developing countries, O.P.l.C has devised various programs to stimulate private 
investment in those countries. One program offers political risk insurance to American inves-
tors. Another practical program is the Opportunity Bank. It assimilates relevant data on 
western and eastern firms that are interested in finding a compatible match for investment 
purposes. 
91. See OPIC to Provide Political Risk Insurance for $150 Million GE Investment in Hun-
gary, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 77 (Jan. 17, 1990). 
92. See Commerce's Willkie Discusses Administration Efforts to Assist Reform in Eastern 
Europe, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1308 (Aug. 22, 1990) [hereinafter Reform 
Efforts]. 
93. See id. See also BULLETIN, supra note 89, at 2. In the Polish and Hungarian experi-
ence, boards of directors have been established to administer the allotted funds. The boards 
are comprised of U.S.-Polish and U.S.-Hungarian managers who are responsible for allocating 
the funds to appropriate activities. Examples of activities eligible for funding include: joint 
venture financing for proposed U.S.-Polish or U.S.-Hungarian ventures; financing of local 
small businesses; or other financial strategies that will aid in the development of the private 
sector. 
94. See Reform Efforts, supra note 92. 
95. See U.S., Czechoslovakia Agree on Terms of Trade Pact, Paving Way for MFN Status, 
7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 498 (Apr. 11, 1990). The agreement was concluded in 
April of 1990. The bill was subsequently held up due to Congressional haggling over a mini 
trade bill (H.R. 1594). The mini-trade bill was signed into law on August 20, 1990, effectively 
updating the guidelines governing U.S. trade with Eastern Europe and opening the door to 
passage of the U.S.-Czechoslovakian trade agreement. See President Bush Transmits U.S.-
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consequence of the trade agreement is the U.S. decision to pursue a 
bilateral investment treaty (B.l.T.) with the government of the 
C.S.F.R.96 The U.S. objective in negotiating a B.I.T. is to establish 
explicit legal norms and effective enforcement measures to protect in-
vestment activities of U.S. individuals in a foreign state.97 
A B.I.T. will ultimately work in conjunction with the bilateral 
trade agreement to give the private investor maximum protection in 
the areas of currency transfer and exchange, political risk (making 
provision for the possibility of due compensation for expropriation by 
the host country), and governmental non-interference in business op-
erations.98 A notable incentive to western investment in the B.I.T. is 
a provision that gives U.S. companies unlimited profit repatriation 
rights.99 
Another consequence of the U.S.-Czechoslovakian trade agree-
ment is recent adoption of a new patent code by the C.S.F.R.'s Parlia-
ment.100 This law·, which went into effect on January 1, 1991, amends 
the 1972 Patent Act, grants protection of patents for 20 years, and 
protects registered industrial designs for an initial five year period that 
is then extendable for another ten years upon application. 101 Finally, 
in conjunction with U.S. involvement in talks to streamline the Coor-
dinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control's (C.O.C.O.M.) 
Czechoslovak Trade Pact to Congress, Urges Quick Action, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 36, 
at 1355 (Sept. 12, 1990). 
The central element of the agreement is the conferral of MFN status on the C.S.F.R. 
MFN status is the basis of normalized trade relations, allowing countries to trade freely with-
out the burden of higher tariff rates imposed on the goods of those countries that do not 
qualify for MFN status. Jan Skvara, the C.S.F.R. Foreign Trade Ministry's expert on U.S. 
trade, hailed the agreement as the means to increased C.S.F.R. presence in U.S. markets. See 
id. 
From a U.S. perspective, the agreement is viewed as a time-saving measure that will 
"clearly improve the access that our [U.S.] companies will have to the C.S.F.R. market, and 
help them regain some of the ground that they may have lost to their European and Japanese 
competitors." Senate Approves MFN Trade Status for Czechoslovakia by Unanimous Consent, 
7 lnt'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 1645 (Oct. 31, 1990). 
96. See U.S.-Czechoslovakian Trade Pact Approved by House Ways and Means, 7 Int'l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1485 (Sept. 26, 1990). For a detailed description of the evolution 
of U.S. policy toward bilateral investment treaties, see Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 
24 INT'L LAW. 655 (1990) [hereinafter Salacuse]. 
97. See Salacuse, supra note 96, at 657. 
98. See id. 
99. See Czechoslovakia Set to Grant U.S. Businesses Broad Investment Incentives and 
Safeguards, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 22 (Jan. 2, 1991). 
100. See Czechoslovakia Revises Patent Law to Comply with U.S. Conditions for Extending 
MFN Status, lnt'l Trade Daily (BNA) 22 (Jan. 23, 1991). 
101. See id. 
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list of restricted exports, the U.S. Department of Commerce and the 
Bush Administration are working to limit the number of items re-
stricted from export to Eastern Europe under U.S. export regula-
tions. 102 By lifting export controls, potential investors will be assured 
that they will be able to import necessary production materials into 
the host country .103 
B. International Aids to Investment 
United States governmental and private funding efforts work to 
provide sources of insurance and financial incentives to direct invest-
ment in the C.S.F.R. Various multilateral efforts of interest to the 
potential investor are also being employed to encourage economic 
growth in Eastern Europe. Of paramount importance to the potential 
investor is the fact that C.0.C.0.M. is diligently working to substan-
tially reduce restrictions on exportable items to the Eastern Europe 
countries. 104 
For the C.S.F.R., and parties interested in its economic stability, 
the proposed relaxed restrictions are significant in two respects. First, 
the general liberalization of constraints on the export of manufactur-
ing materials and machine tools to Eastern Europe will enable the 
C.S.F.R. to easily avail itself of basic items necessary to the efficient 
operation of a multitude of industrial enterprises. 105 Second, the spe-
102. Reform Efforts, supra note 92, at 1308. See also Edward L. Rubinoff, Restraints on 
Trading with Eastern Europe: COCOM and U.S. Export Controls, Address Before the A.B.A. 
Section oflnternational Trade Committee (June 21, 1990) [hereinafter Rubinoff]. The Bureau 
of Export Administration maintains a list of restricted goods (the Commodity Control List) 
similar to C.O.C.O.M.'s International List. 
103. See U.S. Chamber Urges Administration to Liberalize Exports to East Bloc, 7 Int'l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 180 (Feb. 7, 1990). See also Sen Kerry Planning to Introduce Bill 
on Revising Export Administration Act, 7 lnt'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 723 (May 23, 
1990). 
104. See Rubinoff, supra note 102. C.O.C.O.M. maintains three lists, the purpose of 
which is to "restrict the access of countries which pose threats to the national security of the 
C.O.C.O.M. allies to goods and technology which could significantly contribute to their mili-
tary capabilities.'' Id. See also Export Controls: Commerce Official Foresees More Liberal 
Trade Rules for Parts of Eastern Europe, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 1700 (Nov. 20, 
1991). 
In light of the democratic changes sweeping these targeted countries, C.O.C.O.M. is in 
the midst of reducing the restricted items on the respective lists to only those that may still 
wield a viable threat (e.g. export of military weapons or parts) to the national security of the 
concerned countries. 
105. See European Community to Lift Import Quotas Now Imposed on Bulgaria and 
Czechoslovakia, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at 1119 (July 18, 1990). Export-oriented 
joint ventures would benefit from further relaxation of export controls currently imposed by 
the European Community (EC) on exports coming from Eastern European countries. On July 
11, 1990, the Commission of the EC proposed that all quantitative restrictions covering the 
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cific procedures C.0.C.0.M. proposes for the C.S.F.R., as well as 
Hungary and Poland, will provide it with substantially increased ac-
cess to contemporary telecommunications equipment. 106 Such in-
creased access opens up the possibility of lucrative U.S. joint venture 
activity in the C.S.F.R.101 
Other incentives are provided by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank and its affiliates. The IMF and 
World Bank are working to meet the capital needs of Eastern Euro-
pean countries by providing loans and financial aid and offering vari-
ous political and other non-business risk insurance packages to 
interested investors. 108 For example, the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (M.l.G.A.) is an affiliate of the World Bank that 
provides insurance against political upheaval and other non-economic 
risks incurred by companies investing in the newly democratized 
countries of Eastern Europe. 109 Accordingly, M.l.G.A. offers con-
tracts to foreign investors that guarantee against losses generated by 
non-business risks. 110 M.l.G.A. does, however, require that both the 
investor's country and the targeted country be members of the 
agency, which is open to all World Bank members.m 
Another source of investment aid open to the potential investor 
is the International Finance Corporation (I.F.C.). 112 The l.F.C. is de-
scribed as the "largest source of direct project financing for private 
investment in the developing world" .113 It reports that the automo-
export of industrial and agricultural products from the C.S.F.R. and Bulgaria be removed. 
The proposal requires approval by the EC's Council to become effective. Should the proposal 
be adopted, exports such as men's shoes and hunting ammunition to the Benelux countries, 
semiconductors, toys and pottery to France, and chemical products to Spain would be freed 
from long-standing limitations on the number of these products allowed into the respective EC 
states. 
106. See COCOM High Level Meeting: Fact Sheet at 4. 
107. See Bell Atlantic, US West Win Contract for Cellular Phones in Czechoslovakia, 7 
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 1810 (Nov. 28, 1990). On November 16, 1990, Bell Tele-
phone and U.S. West signed a joint venture contract with the C.S.F.R. Post and Telecommuni-
cations Administration to "build and operate cellular mobile telephone and packet data 
networks." Id. 
108. See World Bank Investment Promotion Agency Set to Guarantee 10 Projects This 
Year, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 1376 (Sept. 12, 1990). 
109. See id. 
110. See id. 
111. See id. 
112. See World Bank's IFC Will Aid Poland's Program for Privitazation and Help Estab-
lish Bank, 7 lnt'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 1379 (Sept. 12, 1990). 
113. Id. The l.F.C., a World Bank affiliate, is not only involved in financing western joint 
ventures in Eastern Europe. It is also aiding these countries in their privatization efforts. For 
example, the l.F.C. is currently active in Polish privatization efforts, helping the government 
to create a wholly private bank (the first of its kind in Poland), and an agency that will "help 
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tive industry is one potentially lucrative area for investment in a "de-
veloping country."114 In the traditional developing countries such as 
the Latin American or sub-Saharan nations, whose economies are 
crumbling under the immense pressure of the growing debt crisis, for-
eign investment has dramatically decreased. These nations were ini-
tially areas of high levels of foreign investment. However, these 
developing countries generated independence agendas in the 1970s, 
and moved away from agreements and concessions which they 
deemed exploitative. This movement resulted in a shift away from 
dependence on investment capital to financing. 11s 
Although the C.S.F.R. and its Eastern European neighbors are 
not "developing countries" per se, 116 these former communist coun-
tries may be accorded special dispensation as quasi-developing coun-
tries. Considering their need for capital assistance to successfully 
move from a state-controlled to a free-market economy, Eastern Eu-
small businesses raise money and undertake financial planning." Id. The l.F.C.'s executive 
vice-president asserts that the C.S.F.R. will soon join the agency. See id. 
114. See Automotive Industry, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) 26 (Oct. 11, 1990). The l.F.C. 
points to the automotive industry as a profitable focal area because it is linked to numerous 
other industries. For example, automobile manufacturing is tied to various service sectors, 
including marketing, shipping, insurance, service and mining. However, when devising an 
investment strategy, the investor must take into account import regulations, import quotas and 
voluntary restraint agreements that may restrict the potential for selling her product in such 
markets as the U.S. or the E.C. Regarding foreign investment in the developing world, see 
Kevin J. McGinty, Opening the Courts to Protect Interests Abroad, 10 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 
63 (1990) [hereinafter McGinty]. See also Carsten.T. Ebenroth, The Changing Legal Perspec-
tive/or Resolving the Debt Crisis: A European's Perspective, 23 INT'L LAW. 629 (1989) [herein-
after Ebenroth]. 
115. See McGinty, supra note 114, at 3 - 7. See also Ebenroth, supra note 114, at 20. 
These countries also displayed their disapproval of equity investment by passing strict foreign 
investment laws. These laws prohibited investment in many industrial areas, and arbitrarily 
allotted expropriation rights to the governing authorities over foreign interests. These factors 
combined to effectively discourage any substantial investment in these regions. 
To date, a number of these countries have relaxed their attitudes toward foreign invest-
ment, recognizing a dire need for capital to bolster their faltering economies. However, unlike 
the Eastern European changes in statutory law, much of the developing countries' modifica-
tions have been administrative only. See Carla A. Hills, Testimony of Ambassador Carla A. 
Hills, United States Trade Representative, Before the Subcommittee on Trade, Committee on 
Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, June 14, 1990, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 583 
(1991). Consequently, investors will be more attracted to those countries that have effectuated 
a pro-investment legal regime. 
116. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1989 at x (1989) [hereinafter 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT]. The World Bank classifies countries into various groupings. The 
mode of classification will depend on the purpose of the categorization. For example a "devel-
oping country" listing is based on a country's per capita GNP for purposes of statistical analy-
sis. Because of the size of GNP in the countries of Eastern Europe, those countries 
consequently fall outside of the "developing country" index for statistical analysis purposes. 
Id. 
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ropean countries may be viewed in the same category as per se devel-
oping countries117 for purposes of determining eligibility for aid. 118 
Funds are also available from the newly founded European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (E.B.R.D.), which plans to util-
ize a variety of fiscal tools to assist in the Eastern European economic 
transformation. 119 Notably, the bank's charter mandates that a mini-
mum of sixty percent of its yearly lending totals be directed towards 
the private sector.12° 
C. Evidence of Successful Investment in Eastern Europe 
The potential U.S. investor might also look to the other Eastern 
European countries for assurances that westerners can and do over-
come the various obstacles to successfully establishing business enter-
prises in these emerging free-market systems.121 Hungary is a prime 
example. Hungary's desire for western investment has led the govern-
ment to adopt increasingly flexible revisions to its original joint ven-
ture legislation. 122 Hungary's flexibility has attracted western capital 
in the form of joint venture enterprises with successful businesses such 
as Suzuki Motors of Japan, Adidas of Germany, Societe Generale of 
France, Volvo of Sweden, Jolt of Canada and General Electric and 
General Motors of the U.S.123 These companies were drawn to the 
Hungarian marketplace as a result of the Hungarian government's de-
117. See id. at X, XI. Traditional classification of developing countries includes those 
nations whose economies fall into a low or middle bracket in terms of gross national product, 
e.g. Latin American, Sub-Saharan, and Middle Eastern countries. Contrast classification for 
statistical analysis, whereby GNP measures of Eastern European countries precludes those 
countries from developing status for that particular purpose. Id. at 158-61. 
118. See id. at XI. While the term "developing country" is conveniently employed by the 
international community, it does not necessarily reflect a country's development status based 
on any set criteria, nor does it imply that all such countries are at similar levels of develop-
ment. See also World Bank Investment Promotion Agency, supra note 108. 
119. See East European Bank Will Create Foreign Investment Opportunities, Official Says, 
7 lnt'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1449 (Sept. 19, 1990). The United States has committed 
itself to a ten percent share of the bank's capital. A French financial minister stated that the 
E.B.R.D. will be actively involved in joint venture activities and that a wealth of foreign invest-
ment opportunities will soon be available. Id. 
120. See id. 
121. See U.S. Manufacturing Firm's Investments Abroad Rise by JO Percent in First Half 
of Year, 7 lnt'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1557 (Oct. 10, 1990). The Multinational Register 
produces data and analyses on U.S. foreign investment. 
The U.N. Economic Commission for Europe (E.C.E.) also issues its own publication con-
cerning relevant information on investment in Eastern European countries. 
122. U.N. EcoN. COMMISSION FOR EUR. EAST-WEST JOINT VENTURES at 148, U.N. 
Doc. ECE/Trade/162, U.N. Sales No. E.88.11.E.18 (1988). See also Eichmann, supra note 17, 
at 257. 
123. See Eichmann, supra note 17, at 258. 
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cision to relax controls on foreign investment, including the easing of 
registration requirements and allowing for majority foreign 
ownership. 124 
Hungary's move towards a decentralized economy made it easier 
for foreigners to do business because the bureaucratic trials of negoti-
ating with a multitude of state-planning agencies were obviated. As 
the economies of Eastern European countries become increasingly di-
vorced from state control, the pricing mechanism will be based on 
economic forces such as supply and demand rather than bureaucratic 
demands.125 The Hungarian success story may be repeated in the 
C.S.F.R.126 
The government of the C.S.F.R. is striving towards a free market 
economy, and working to dismantle the restrictions previously placed 
on foreign investment by the communist regime. 127 The new govern-
ment's goal in amending its economic laws is "to help open the 
Czechoslovak economy to the rest of the world."128 Whereas numer-
ous European and Asian investors have moved in and reaped the ben-
efits of the liberal Hungarian investment laws, the C.S.F.R.'s recent 
legislative enactments encouraging joint venture participation have 
yet to be taken advantage of by U.S. investors. 129 
V. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, U.S. companies are encouraged to act quickly, but 
prudently with respect to investment in the C.S.F.R. 130 Investors are 
124. See id. at 262. 
125. See id. at 269. 
126. See Prospective Investors Advised to Establish New Businesses Rather Than Buy Ex-
isting Ones, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1486 (Sept. 26, 1990). Laszlo Bonnay, a 
representative of Price Waterhouse's Budapest office, declares that successful ventures in Hun-
gary include the start-up business efforts of Levi Strauss, McDonald's restaurant and DHL 
Overnight Delivery Company. 
Hungarian investment interest has been encouraged by the availability of loans through 
the American-Hungarian Enterprise Fund which announced the approval of $1.1 million in 
loans to various proposed joint ventures. For example, a loan of $500,000 has been approved 
for a computer retailing joint venture between the U.S. company Donasphere and two Hun-
garian computer retailers to sell computers and related products in newly established Hun-
garian retail outlets. 
127. See Remarks, supra note 1, at 35. 
128. CZECHOSLOVAK CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, REMARKS ON THE 
AMENDED ACT ON EcONOMIC RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES 3 (1990). 
129. See East-West, supra note 3, at 4. 
130. See President Signs Landmark Legislation Extending MFN Status to Czechoslovakia, 
7 lnt'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1735 (Nov. 14, 1990). Speakers at the 1990 U.S.-Czech-
oslovak Economic Council annual meeting advised U.S. investors considering potential joint 
venture partners, that it would be necessary to negotiate such legal and business issues as 
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advised to monitor the C.S.F.R.'s reform efforts, specifically its ac-
complishment of the currency convertibility plan, privatization pro-
gram, further modification of application and authorization 
procedures and ratification of a B.I.T. that includes profit repatriation 
rights. Where ambiguities exist in the C.S.F.R.'s legislation, western 
investors should exercise caution and delineate precisely the details of 
the proposed venture in the particular contract. Smaller business con-
cerns, with less capital and management resources available for in-
vestment than their larger corporate and multinational corporation 
counterparts, should proceed with particular caution. As noted 
above, the C.S.F.R. is feeling the loss of economic support it de-
pended on in subsidized trade and energy imports from the Soviet 
Union. The investor must also bear. in mind the fact that the C.S.F.R. 
relied heavily on its Eastern European neighbors for raw materials, 
which are currently in short supply. Finally, while making progress 
in its market reforms, legislation will need to undergo further revi-
sion, specifically in the areas of profit repatriation and tax conces-
sions, before the C.S.F.R. will be able to offer a truly attractive 
investment regime. 
Bearing in mind these warnings, U.S. companies willing and able 
to commit to equitable investment agreements with partners from the 
C.S.F.R. have the opportunity to capture a share in a potentially lu-
crative market. 131 In agreeing to a publishing joint venture with a 
C.S.F.R. partner, a U.S. professional noted that "[t]he new freedom in 
the East has resulted in the same criterion of a book's value that holds 
in the West: sales potential, and the harder the currency, the better 
the book." 132 Such deals will aid the fledgling democracy on its road 
foreign currency reserves, managerial training and technical assistance. It was also noted that 
western investors should be sensitive to C.S.F.R. labor and environmental concerns. For ex-
ample, investors need to work with the C.S.F.R. to counter the drastic pollution problems it is 
experiencing. Investors should work with their counterparts in the C.S.F.R. to enact indus-
trial pollution regulations. Investors could also assist their partners by offering management 
training and marketing seminars. This type of training might include visits to U.S. plants 
showing how business strategies are put into the market. Id. 
131. See Herbert Mitgang, Publishing for Love&: Money in Kafka's Land, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 23, 1990, § 4, at 6. The C.S.F.R.'s traditional emphasis on literary production has made 
the C.S.F.R. a publishing nation. In the wake of the internal political upheaval, the state 
publishing agency is no longer in control of the C.S.F.R.'s publishing industry. 
Charles University and the University of Nebraska Press have taken advantage of the new 
political and economic freedom by entering into a publishing cooperative. The marketing 
manager of Nebraska Press, Diane Wanek, took affirmative steps to launch the venture. She 
appealed to Apple Computer-Europe to contribute to the reform of the publishing industry by 
donating three Macintosh II Computers that would help establish the new venture. Ms. 
Wanek then traveled to Prague to train the Czech staff in desktop publishing. Id. 
132. Id. 
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to reform while simultaneously effecting a profitable return for the 
individual enterprises involved. Although not exhaustive, the forego-
ing list of investment programs and risk guarantors evidences that the 
potential foreign investor also has a wealth of tools available to allevi-
ate concerns regarding inadequate safeguards in the C.S.F.R.'s invest-
ment legislation. 
Thus, for those investors with adequate resource and initiative, 
the C.S.F.R.'s historically solid economic base, developed infrastruc-
ture and governmental commitment to market reform make it a more 
attractive forum for venturing into the Eastern European marketplace 
than some of its more debt-strapped neighbors. For example, with its 
low debt record, the C.S.F.R. may qualify for loans and credit more 
readily than a country with large debt obligations. Positive market 
reform measures include wholesale and retail price liberalization, 
tightened monetary policy, a legislatively approved privatization pro-
gram and maintenance of a fixed exchange rate. 133 Lifting of the 
C.O.C.0.M. restrictions will allow western countries to export neces-
sary raw materials into the C.S.F.R., alleviating hardship caused by 
the loss of subsidized trade with the Soviet Union and other Eastern 
European neighbors. Furthermore, the government of the C.S.F.R. 
has announced its desire for western investment in general, and U.S. 
involvement in particular. In the final analysis, while the investor 
would be wise to exercise routine caution in examining joint venture 
prospects in the C.S.F.R., the legal, economic and political support 
for western investment in the C.S.F.R. should ultimately sway the 
decision of the enterprising investor in favor of taking a chance, and 
investing in democracy. 
Kristina Smith 
133. See In the News, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 130 (Jan. 23, 1991). 
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